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14.1 Introduction
The literature on capital controls has (at least) four very serious issues
that make it diﬃcult, if not impossible, to compare across theoretical and
empirical studies. We dub these apples-to-oranges problems, and they are
as follows. First, there is no uniﬁed theoretical framework (say, as in the
currency crisis literature) to analyze the macroeconomic consequences of
controls. Second, there is signiﬁcant heterogeneity across countries and
time in the capital control measures implemented. Third, there are mul-
tiple deﬁnitions of what constitutes success (capital controls are a single
policy instrument—but there are many policy objectives). Fourth, the em-
pirical studies lack a common methodology and are furthermore signiﬁ-
cantly overweighted by the two poster children—Chile and Malaysia.
Our goal in this paper is to ﬁnd a common ground among the noncompa-
rabilities in the existing literature. Of course, there is usually a level of gener-
ality that is suﬃciently encompassing. After all, an apples-to-oranges prob-
lem can be solved by calling everything fruit. Our goal is, as far as possible, to
classify diﬀerent measures of capital controls on a uniform basis. Once done,
it should be easier to understand the cross-country and time series experience.
We attempt to address some of these apples-to-oranges shortcomings by
being very explicit about what measures are construed as capital controls.
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tano for useful comments and suggestions.episodes and between controls on inﬂows and outﬂows, but also the more
subtle diﬀerences in types of inﬂow or outﬂow controls. Also, given that
success is measured so diﬀerently across studies, we standardize (wherever
possible) the results of over thirty empirical studies summarized in this pa-
per. As far as possible, we bring to bear the experiences of episodes less well
known than those of Chile and Malaysia.
The standardization was done by constructing two indexes of capital
controls: indexes of capital controls eﬀectiveness and weighted capital con-
trol eﬀectiveness. The diﬀerence between them lies only in the fact that the
WCCE controls for the diﬀerentiated degree of methodological rigor ap-
plied to draw conclusions in each of the papers considered.
Our results from these indexes can be summarized brieﬂy. Capital con-
trols on inﬂows seem to make monetary policy more independent, alter the
composition of capital ﬂows, and reduce real exchange rate pressures (al-
though the evidence there is more controversial). Capital controls on in-
ﬂows seem not to reduce the volume of net ﬂows (and hence the current ac-
count balance). As to controls on outﬂows, there is Malaysia and there is
everybody else. In Malaysia, controls reduced outﬂows and may have given
room for more independent monetary policy (the other poster child does
not fare as well, in that our results are not as conclusive as for the Chilean
controls on inﬂows). Absent the Malaysian experience, there is little sys-
tematic evidence of success in imposing controls, however deﬁned.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section summarizes some of the
key reasons why capital controls—particularly capital controls on in-
ﬂows—are either considered or implemented. Controls, as we note, help
deal with what we dub the “four fears.” Section 14.3 focuses on the dis-
tinctions among types of capital controls—highlighting the fact that not
all capital control measures are created equal and therefore they cannot
be simply lumped together in a rough capital controls index. Section 14.4
examines the existing empirical evidence by standardizing and sorting
studies along a variety of criteria. Speciﬁcally, we focus on the following
sorting strategy. First, we analyze separately cases where the study was
multicountry or focused on a single case study; second, we distinguish the
cases where the controls were primarily designed to deal with inﬂows or
outﬂows; third, we provide an ad hoc (but uniform) criteria to rank the ap-
proach or econometric rigor applied in the study to test hypotheses about
the eﬀects of the controls; and, last, we evaluate the outcomes reported in
the studies according to the deﬁnition of what constitutes a success. The
last section discusses some of the policy implications of our ﬁndings.
14.2 The Rationale for Capital Controls and the “Four Fears”
Anyone examining the literature on capital controls, which spans many
decades and all the regions around the globe, would be well advised to re-
646 Nicolas Magud and Carmen M. Reinharttain a sense of irony. Repeatedly, policymakers have sought refuge in tax
laws, supervisory restraint, and regulation of ﬁnancial transactions to cope
with external forces that they deem to be unacceptable. Often they ration-
alize their actions on loftier grounds, sometimes so eﬀectively as to make it
diﬃcult to clearly identify episodes of controls on capital. But in all these
episodes, four fears lurk beneath the surface.
14.2.1 Fear of Appreciation
Being the darling of investors in global ﬁnancial centers has the decided,
albeit often temporary, advantage of having ample access to funds at favor-
able cost. With the capital inﬂow comes upward pressure on the exchange
value of the currency, rendering domestic manufacturers less competitive
in global markets, and especially so relative to their close competitors
who are not so favored as an investment vehicle. A desire to stem such an
appreciation (which Calvo and Reinhart 2002 refer to as “fear of ﬂoat-
ing”) is typically manifested in the accumulation of foreign exchange re-
serves. Over time, though, sterilizing such reserve accumulation (the topic
of Reinhart and Reinhart 1998) becomes more diﬃcult, and more direct
intervention more appealing.
14.2.2 Fear of “Hot Money”
For policymakers in developing countries, becoming the object of for-
eign investors’ attention is particularly troubling if such aﬀection is viewed
as ﬂeeting. The sudden injection of funds into a small market can cause an
initial dislocation that is mirrored by the strains associated with their sud-
den withdrawal. Such a distrust of “hot money” was behind James Tobin’s
initial proposal to throw sand in the wheels of international ﬁnance, an
idea that has been well received in at least some quarters. Simply put, a high
enough tax (if eﬀectively enforced) would dissuade the initial inﬂow and
preempt the pain associated with the inevitable outﬂow.
14.2.3 Fear of Large Inﬂows
Policymakers in emerging market economies do not universally distrust
the providers of foreign capital. Not all money is hot, but sometimes the
sheer volume of ﬂows matters. A large volume of capital inﬂows, particu-
larly when it is sometimes indiscriminate in the search for higher yields (in
the manner documented by Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart 1994), causes
dislocations in the ﬁnancial system. Foreign funds can fuel asset price bub-
bles and encourage excessive risk taking by cash-rich domestic intermedi-
aries. Again, recourse to taxation may seem to yield a large beneﬁt.
14.2.4 Fear of Loss of Monetary Autonomy
The interests of global investors and domestic policymakers need not al-
ways—or even often—align. But a trinity is always at work: it is not pos-
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autonomy, and open capital markets (as discussed in Frankel 2001). If
there is some attraction to retaining some element of monetary policy ﬂex-
ibility, something has to give. However, in the presence of the aforemen-
tioned fear of ﬂoating, giving up capital mobility may seem more attractive
than surrendering monetary policy autonomy.
Whatever the reason for action, some forms of capital control were in-
tended to control exchange rate pressures, stem large inﬂows, and regain an
element of monetary autonomy. And this is more relevant for those poli-
cymakers who impose controls to reduce capital ﬂight, because investors
seeking safety—including, most important, domestic residents as well as
foreigners—are seldom dissuaded by regulatory restraint.
14.3 What Do We Mean by Capital Controls?
In most of the empirical literature there are no distinctions between con-
trols on outﬂows and controls on inﬂows; these exercises suﬀer from the
same problems as the de jure International Monetary Fund (IMF) classi-
ﬁcation of exchange rate arrangements. Even when a distinction is made
between inﬂows and outﬂows (as here), controls can and do range from the
explicit to the subtle, from the market friendly to the coercive.1
Furthermore, when considering the impacts and eﬀectiveness of capital
controls one cannot lump together the experiences of countries that have
not substantially liberalized (e.g., India and China) with countries that ac-
tually went down the path of ﬁnancial and capital account liberalization
and decided at some point to reintroduce controls, as the latter have devel-
oped institutions and practices that are integrated in varying degrees to in-
ternational capital markets.
Appendices D and E, which squarely focus on measures targeted to
aﬀect inﬂows and outﬂows in countries that had already gone the route of
capital account liberalization,2 indeed highlight the heterogeneity in both
subtlety and market friendliness of capital control measures that have been
tried in Asia, Europe, and Latin America during booms (these involve con-
trols on capital inﬂows) as well as crashes (and attempts to curb capital
outﬂows). These measures diﬀer not only in subtlety and other features but
also in intensity.3
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1. There is, of course, the important issue of temporary versus permanent policies, a dis-
tinction not addressed here because most empirical studies do not focus on this issue. For a
model and a discussion of the temporary-versus-permanent issue, see Reinhart and Smith
(2002).
2. Hence, these cases involve the reintroduction of controls.
3. For a measure that quantiﬁes the intensity of these measures see Montiel and Reinhart
(1999).14.4 The Empirical Literature: Finding a Common Ground
This section aims to overcome (or at least take a step in that direction)
two of the apples-to-oranges problems we have identiﬁed in the capital
controls literature. Namely, we attempt to (a) ascertain when and in what
capacity capital controls were successful in achieving the stated objectives
of the authorities (this is not trivial, as what constitutes as a success is de-
ﬁned very diﬀerently across studies), and (b) standardize (to some extent)
the very eclectic array of descriptive and empirical methodologies and ap-
proaches that have characterized the empirical literature on capital con-
trols. Lastly, we bring to bear evidence on episodes less familiar than the
“classics” (Chile’s controls on inﬂows starting in 1990 and Malaysia’s 1998
controls on outﬂows).
In what follows, we review more than thirty papers that study capital
controls on either inﬂows or outﬂows around the world. Some are country
case studies, some describe several individual country experiences, and
some are multicountry studies that bunch several cases together. As noted
earlier, the papers measure “success” diﬀerently; thus, our aim is to stan-
dardize methodology and results where possible so as to facilitate com-
parisons. Not only will this enable us to assess the eﬀectiveness of alterna-
tive capital controls events, but it will also permit us to evaluate some of the
policy implications of imposing controls on capital inﬂows and/or out-
ﬂows under alternative scenarios.
14.4.1 Types of Studies
We proceed as follows. First, we cluster the papers into three broad
groups: capital inﬂows (CI), capital outﬂows (CO), and multicountry
(MC)—the latter including the analysis of capital inﬂows, capital outﬂows,
or both. We collected studies of capital controls for the following countries
(the number of papers is shown in parentheses). For CI, there are studies
on Brazil (6), Chile (11), Colombia (3), the Czech Republic (1), Malaysia
(2), and Thailand (1). For CO, we obtained information for Malaysia (5),
Spain (3), and Thailand (2). For the MC group, we collected ﬁve papers,
covering a wide array of countries.4
14.4.2 Objective(s) of Capital Controls
Given the multiple objectives that capital controls are expected to
achieve, we approached each paper with a series of questions. We asked
whether, according to each paper, capital controls were able to
• Reduce the volume of capital ﬂows
• Alter the composition of capital ﬂows (toward longer-maturity ﬂows)
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4. For example, one of the more comprehensive multicountry papers uses monthly data for
the period 1971–98 for a panel of twenty-six countries.• Reduce real exchange rate pressures
• Allow for a more independent monetary policy
As a ﬁrst step in sorting this information, we constructed tables 14.1–14.3.
Table 14.1 includes CI episodes, table 14.2 displays CO episodes, and table
14.3 focuses on MC studies. As can be seen in the tables, possible answers
are “yes,” “no,” and blank space. If the table reads “yes” in any cell, it
means that the paper ﬁnds that the corresponding objective of capital con-
trols was achieved. “No” stands for the paper ﬁnding that there was not
such eﬀect as a result of the capital controls. A blank space means that the
paper does not address whether there was an eﬀect. Sometimes the answer
is followed by (ST). This indicates that the eﬀects were only temporary—
that is, that an objective was achieved only in the short term. To give an ex-
ample, in table 14.1, the paper by Laurens and Cardoso (1998) studying the
case of the Chilean experience during the 1990s ﬁnds evidence that capital
controls were able to reduce the volume of capital ﬂows only in the short
term, that they were able to alter the composition of these ﬂows toward
longer-maturity ﬂows, and that they were not successful in reducing pres-
sures on the real exchange rate. They do not report results regarding the
eﬀectiveness of capital controls in making monetary policy more indepen-
dent.
In a ﬁrst pass through this information, by inspection, we can summa-
rize it as follows (see table 14.4). We observe that in general the results ob-
tained in these papers suggest that capital controls were successful in al-
tering the composition of capital ﬂows toward longer maturities and in
making monetary policy more independent. However, the papers are not
very informative regarding the eﬀectiveness of capital controls in reducing
the volume of capital ﬂows and reducing real exchange rate pressures.
14.4.3 Indexes of Capital Control Eﬀectiveness
But this is not informative enough, since it still lacks some rigor to eval-
uate the eﬀectiveness of capital controls episodes. In order to better un-
derstand this, we construct two indexes of capital controls eﬀectiveness.
We call them the capital controls eﬀectiveness index (CCE index) and the
weighted capital controls eﬀectiveness index (WCCE index). The only dif-
ference in computing them is that the WCCE index weighs the results ob-
tained in each paper by the degree of methodological rigor applied todraw-
ing conclusions; we discuss this further below.
In both cases, following the information summarized in tables 14.1–14.3,
we arbitrarily assigned the following values:
• If the answer is yes, the corresponding value is 1.
• If the answer is no, the value assigned is –1.
• If the question is not addressed at all, it corresponds to a value of 0.
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on eﬀectiveness
Did controls on outﬂows:
Reduce the 
volume of  Alter the  Reduce real  Make monetary 
net capital  composition  exchange rate  policy more 
Study Sample outﬂows? of ﬂows? pressures? independent?
A. Brazil
Cardoso and Goldfajn  Yes (ST) Yes (ST)
(1998)
Edison and Reinhart  1994 No No
(2001)
Reinhart and Smith  Yes (ST) Yes (ST)
(1998)
Ariyoshi et al. (2000) 1993–97 No No No Yes (ST)
B. Chile
De Gregorio, Edwards,  1988:Q1– Yes Yes (ST) Yes (ST) Yes (ST)
and Valdés (2000) 1998:Q2
Edwards (1999b) Yes No Yes (ST)
Edwards (1999a) June 1991– No Yes No Yes
September 1998
Edwards and Rigobon  January 1991– Yes
(2004) September 1999
Gallego, Hernández,  Yes (ST) Yes (ST) No Yes
and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(1999)
Labán and Larraín 
(1998)
Larraín, Labán, and  1985–94 No Yes
Chumacero (2000)
Laurens and Cardoso  Yes (ST) Yes No
(1998)
Le Fort and Budnevich  1990–94 No Yes Yes Yes
(1997)
Reinhart and Smith  Yes (ST) Yes (ST)
(1998)
Valdés-Prieto and Soto  1987–95 No Yes No No
(2000)
Ariyoshi et al. (2000) 1991–98 No No No Yes
C. Colombia
Le Fort and Budnevich  1990–95 Yes (ST) Yes Yes Yes
(1997)
Reinhart and Smith  No No
(1998)
Ariyoshi et al. (2000) 1993–98 No No No Yes
(continued)These values are designed to equally weigh the existence or nonexistence of
eﬀects as a result of the imposition of capital controls and to give no weight
to questions not addressed, so as not to distort the results in case any ob-
jective of capital controls is not addressed by the paper. With these values
at hand, for each country we computed simple averages of these numbers
for each of the four questions we brought to the papers. This gives, for ex-
ample, a CCE index for volume reduction for each country, a CCE index
for real exchange rate pressure reduction for each country, and so on. With
this information we are able to compare, for each objective, which country
was most eﬀective. We also used this information to compute an aggregate
index of capital controls eﬀectiveness, by averaging out the four CCE in-
dexes for each country, and then compiled a global CCE index across coun-
tries.
However, as has already been mentioned, the methodology used in these
papers to evaluate success is highly heterogeneous. Some papers are mainly
descriptive, generating conclusions from the movements (or lack thereof)
in the time series of the main variables, and lack any rigorous statistical or
econometric analysis. Other papers use some statistical or econometric
methodology to evaluate capital control events, but among them there is
still wide variation in the degree of rigor used to extract conclusions from
the data.
In order to control for these diﬀerences, we made another pass through
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Table 14.1 (continued)
Did controls on outﬂows:
Reduce the 
volume of  Alter the  Reduce real  Make monetary 
net capital  composition  exchange rate  policy more 
Study Sample outﬂows? of ﬂows? pressures? independent?
D. Czech Republic
Reinhart and Smith  No Yes (ST)
(1998)
E. Malaysia (1989)a
Reinhart and Smith  Yes Yes
(1998)
F. Malaysia (1994)
Ariyoshi et al. (2000) 1994 Yes Yes Yes (ST) Yes
G. Thailand
Ariyoshi et al. (2000) 1995–97 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: A blank entry refers to the cases where the study in question did not analyze that particular rela-
tionship. (ST) refers to cases where only short-term eﬀects were detected.
aNote that there are several studies on Malaysia’s 1998 capital controls targeting outﬂows. Here, we are
referring to the controls on capital inﬂows introduced in January 1994.the information in the papers. We classify each study according to the de-
gree of methodological rigor—low, intermediate, or high—according to
the following criteria. “Low” includes studies that consist mainly of de-
scriptive analysis of events and/or time series. “Intermediate” includes
papers that draw conclusions from a more formal evaluation of events
but still lack any formal hypothesis testing. An example would be papers
that perform time rescaling to compare the eﬀects of capital controls in a
before-and-after analysis. “High” includes only those studies that have
highly developed econometric techniques, with well-deﬁned hypothesis
testing. Appendices A–C summarize the methodology used in each paper,
as well as the corresponding classiﬁcation as low, intermediate, or high,
following these deﬁnitions.
In order to compute the WCCE index, we assigned the following values:
low, 0.1; intermediate, 0.5; and high, 1. With these values at hand, we com-
pute the WCCE index similarly to the CCE index, in order to determine
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Table 14.2 The famous Malaysian case and lesser deities: Summary of key ﬁndings
on eﬀectiveness
Did controls on outﬂows:
Reduce the 
volume of  Alter the  Reduce real  Make monetary 
net capital  composition  exchange rate  policy more 
Study Episode outﬂows? of ﬂows? pressures? independent?
A. Malaysia
Tamirisia (2004) January 1991– Malaysia No Yes
December 2002
Dornbusch (2001) No
Edison and  Yes Yes
Reinhart (2001)
Kaplan and  1992–96 Yes
Rodrik (2002)
Ariyoshi et al.  1998–2000 Yes Yes Yes
(2000)
B. Spain
Viñals (1992) 1992 No
Edison and  1995–99 No No
Reinhart (2001)
Ariyoshi et al.  1992 Yes Yes (ST) Yes
(2000)
C. Thailand
Edison and  No No
Reinhart (2001)
Ariyoshi et al.  1997–98 Yes Yes Yes (ST)
(2000)










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.which country has been most eﬀective in achieving each of the four objec-
tives. We also compute an aggregate (per-country) WCCE index, which en-
ables us to understand which countries capital controls were more useful
in. Furthermore, given this information, we can, at least as a ﬁrst approxi-
mation, ﬁnd conditions under which capital controls tend to be eﬀective.
Once more, it is worth mentioning that these exercises were done sepa-
rately for the three clusters into which we separated the papers: CI, CO,
and MC.
14.4.4 Summary of Results
Summary results of the CCE and WCCE indexes are presented in tables
14.5–14.7. From these indexes, we can extract the following policy conclu-
sions. Looking at the data on controls on inﬂows (table 14.5) along with the
preliminary results in table 14.4, we see that capital controls were able to
make monetary policy more independent, alter the composition of capital
ﬂows toward longer maturities, and reduce real exchange rate pressures (al-
though the evidence on the latter is more controversial). Interestingly, the
usual model economy for this type of controls, Chile, stands out as achiev-
ing these goals quite comfortably, as the WCCE index shows. In this regard,
initial conditions or characteristics such as those in Chile in the early
1990s, along with the continuing reforms during the 1990s, appear to be
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Table 14.4 Summary of results by country and multicountry studies
Did controls on outﬂows:
Reduce the 
volume of  Alter the  Reduce real  Make monetary 
net capital  composition  exchange rate  policy more 
Study outﬂows? of ﬂows? pressures? independent?
Controls on inﬂows
Brazil Unclear Unclear No Unclear
Chile Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Colombia Unclear Unclear Unclear Yes
Czech Republic No Yes
Malaysia (1989) Yes Yes
Malaysia (1994) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Thailand Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls on outﬂows
Malaysia (1998) Unclear Yes
Spain Unclear Unclear Unclear
Thailand Yes Yes Yes
Multicountry studies Yes Yes Yes No
Complete sample Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Note: Yes stands for yes, it worked; No for no, it did not work; Unclear for mixed results; and blanks for
results not reported.Table 14.5 Capital inﬂows: The indexes
Reduce the  Alter the  Reduce real  Make 
volume of net  composition  exchange rate  monetary policy  Country 
Country Index capital inﬂows of ﬂows pressures independent average
Brazil CCE 0.00 0.00 –0.67 0.00 0
WCCE 0.35 0.35 –0.275 –0.225 0.05
Chile CCE –0.09 0.64 –0.27 0.45 0.18
WCCE 0.03 0.67 –0.27 0.29 0.18
Colombia CCE –0.33 –0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00
WCCE –0.17 –0.17 0.00 0.07 –0.07
Czech CCE –1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Republic WCCE –0.50 0.10 0.00 0.00 –0.10
Malaysia CCE 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.75
WCCE 0.30 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.18
Thailand CCE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
WCCE 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Source: Table 14.1 and sources cited therein.
Table 14.7 Multicountry studies: The indexes
Reduce the  Alter the  Reduce real  Make 
volume of net  composition  exchange rate  monetary policy  
Index capital inﬂows of ﬂows pressures more independent
CCE 0.00 0.40 0.00 –0.40
WCCE –0.10 0.30 0.00 –0.40
Source: Table 14.1 and sources cited therein.
Table 14.6 Capital outﬂows: The indexes
Reduce the  Alter the  Reduce real  Make 
volume of net  composition  exchange rate  monetary policy  Country 
Country Index capital inﬂows of ﬂows pressures independent average
Malaysia CCE 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.25
WCCE 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.16
Spain CCE 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.38
WCCE 0.05 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.11
Thailand CCE 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13
WCCE 0.05 0.00 –0.50 –0.50 –0.24
Source: Table 14.2 and sources cited therein.necessary in order for capital controls on inﬂows to be eﬀective. On the
other hand, capital controls on inﬂows were not very eﬀective in reducing
the volume of net ﬂows (hence the impact of these ﬂows on the current ac-
count balance).
Looking in more detail, we see that Malaysia (1994) stands out as the
best performer in terms of reducing the volume of capital ﬂows, Chile dom-
inates regarding the change in capital ﬂow maturity, Thailand is superior
in reducing real exchange rate pressures, and Chile again dominates in re-
gard to monetary policy independence. Overall, as the average of the
WCCE index reﬂects, Chile emerges as the most successful example of cap-
ital controls on inﬂows.
Let us now focus on capital controls on outﬂows (table 4.6). The received
wisdom is that Malaysia (1997) is the example to follow. From our results,
we can see that these capital controls were eﬀective in reducing capital out-
ﬂows and in making monetary policy more independent. Yet the results
from WCCE index are not as conclusive as those on the Chilean controls
on inﬂows.
If we focus on reduction in capital ﬂows, Thailand and Spain dominate
Malaysia. Regarding a switch in capital ﬂows toward longer maturity, no
conclusion can be extracted. Spain emerges as the best in real exchange rate
pressure reduction; on the other hand, Malaysia clearly dominates at mak-
ing monetary policy more independent. On the aggregate, Malaysia ap-
pears to be the most successful in its experience of capital controls on out-
ﬂows.
Some further comments are in order. First, it could be argued that these
indexes are not taking into account many other variables that might be
aﬀecting the eﬀectiveness of capital controls, especially the set of other re-
forms being put in place in each country during each capital controls
episode. That is true. However, this paper is reviewing and assessing only
the conclusions contained in previous papers, not the papers themselves.
All the reviewed papers draw conclusions from their information sets, and
we just put them together and try to extract the main message that these pa-
pers give as a group. Furthermore, it is precisely because of this omitted-
variables bias problem that our WCCE index becomes more relevant. For
example, any structural reform carried on in parallel with capital controls
is not usually speciﬁcally reﬂected in the papers we review; in a sense, for
us this is similar to running a regression with missing data that we have to
control for. This is where the degree of methodological rigor becomes im-
portant. The more formal the analysis is, especially if it includes hypothe-
sis testing, the more accurate the information contained in it.
Second, a similar reasoning applies to the endogeneity of capital con-
trols. Some could argue that we should control for it. Again, we rely on the
conclusions obtained in previous papers, thus giving more value to the re-
sults we obtain from WCCE index. Also, this is relevant for how controls
Capital Controls: An Evaluation 657on capital inﬂows aﬀect capital outﬂows. Moreover, that is why we cluster
CI and CO separately in our analysis.
Third, it is worth mentioning that the papers we review are clearly not
the only ones dealing with capital controls. There are many papers that an-
alyze the long-run eﬀects of capital controls, whereas we focus on the short
run only, as can be seen from the questions with which we approach the pa-
pers. Other chapters in this book study the eﬀects of capital controls on
growth; we don’t go into further details since these papers are out of our
scope.
Fourth, another interesting point is whether capital control regimes are
transitory or permanent. Here, as the questions we focus on clearly reveal,
we are interested only in transitory events. This is why episodes such as the
Chinese or Indian approach to capital controls are not covered here; see
the papers on these countries contained in this volume for that purpose.
Fifth, an interesting point to raise is related to the timing (and related
endogeneity) of capital controls: whether they are imposed in response
to events—crises—or if they are designed in advance. Here, once more,
we lack information because we rely only on what the papers conclude. It
is worth mentioning, though, that by inspection it appears that the
Malaysian (1997) episode could have been designed in advance, unlike
most of the other episodes, and contrary to common wisdom. This theory
emerges from the chronologies given in appendices D and E. In the case of
Malaysia, a great quantity of controls was imposed on September 1, 1997.
Furthermore, their level of detail seems to suggest that they were not de-
cided upon and designed just in response to the crises.
Sixth, sometimes temporary capital control events become permanent.
This could be because of time consistency problems or just because of the
current response to future changes: rational expectations call for incorpo-
rating into your current decision the fact that in a prespeciﬁed time period
capital controls will be levied. Furthermore, even if a country imposed cap-
ital controls and did levy them at the preestablished date, this might work
as a signal that capital controls could be imposed in the future if needed.
However, this signal says nothing about the controls being either good or
bad—many things will inﬂuence the latter, especially the controls’ eﬀec-
tiveness, as well as their eﬀects on property rights. At any rate, imposing
capital controls once establishes a precedent regarding a country’s position
toward capital mobility, despite the costs and beneﬁts of such controls.
This is another dimension in which temporary capital controls might be-
come permanent.
14.5 Conclusions
In sum, capital controls on inﬂows seem to make monetary policy more
independent, alter the composition of capital ﬂows, and reduce real ex-
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Capital controls on inﬂows, however, seem not to reduce the volume of net
ﬂows (and, hence, the current account balance).
As for controls on capital outﬂows, there is Malaysia . . . and there is
everybody else. In Malaysia, controls reduce outﬂows and may make room
for more independent monetary policy.6 There is little evidence of success
in other countries that attempt to control outﬂows, either by altering vol-
ume or by regaining monetary policy independence. These ﬁndings are in
line with those of the earlier literature focused on capital ﬂight (as in Math-
ieson and Rojas-Suarez 1996) and dual or parallel exchange markets (as in
Kiguel, Lizondo, and O’Connell 1997).
While the eﬀectiveness of controls varies across time, country, and type
of measures used, limiting private external borrowing in the good times
plays an important prudential role, because more often than not countries
are debt intolerant. Indeed, often the critical problem in good times is that
countries borrow too much!7
While our study has made the case for the need to distinguish measures
primarily designed to discourage inﬂows from those that primarily aim at
curbing outﬂows, it would be worthwhile for future research to attempt to
ascertain whether there are also important diﬀerences in achieving success
between measures that are more market friendly (as in the Chilean reserve
requirements) versus those that are based on more blunt quantitative re-
strictions. Furthermore, in this study, owing to the nature of most of the
empirical work reviewed here (which treats the control measures as single
episodes), it would be interesting for policy purposes to examine diﬀer-
ences between short-run and long-run impacts of the measures, to ascer-
tain how quickly control measures lose their eﬀectiveness.
As long as capital ﬂows to emerging markets remain volatile and poten-
tially disruptive, the discussion of capital controls in academic and policy
circles will remain alive, and hence there is a real need to evaluate their
eﬀectiveness, however deﬁned. As noted earlier, it is an old discussion. To-
bin’s seminal paper (Tobin 1978) dates back to the 1970s. Furthermore,
capital controls have historically been used to deal with the ﬁckle capital
ﬂow cycle for at least two hundred years. Indeed, as in past inﬂow episodes,
at the time of this writing countries like Colombia and Argentina either
have implemented controls on capital inﬂows or are contemplating do-
ing so.
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5. According to the WCCI, Chile stands out in achieving these goals.
6. Yet the results for Malaysia based on the WCCI are not as conclusive as those for the
Chilean controls on inﬂows.
7. See Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savastano (2003) for details.Appendix A
Table A.1 Capital Inﬂows: Methodology and Degree of Methodological Rigor
Econometric 
Study Sample Methodology rigor
A. Brazil
Cardoso and  January 1988– OLS controlling for heteroscedasticity and  High
Goldfajn (1998) December 1995 serial correlation, IV, and VAR. The authors 
control for endogeneity of capital controls 
(government’s reaction function).
Edison and Reinhart  1995–2001 Test for equality of moments and changes  High
(2001) in persistence between capital controls and 
no controls, principal-components analysis; 
block exogeneity tests (VAR) for causality; 
GARCH for the eﬀects of controls on vola-
tility; and Wald tests for structural brakes 
over a rolling window.
Reinhart and Smith  1994–1996 Event comparison through time rescaling  Medium
(1998) (labeling the implementation of controls as 
period t, and analyzing the evolution of the 
series in t – 1 through t   2). Detailed 
chronological description of the various 
measures applied in each economy.
Ariyoshi et al. (2000) 1993–1997 Extensive descriptive and comparative  Low
country-studies analysis of time series in 
each episode, dividing facts according to 
controls on capital inﬂows (limiting short-
term ﬂows), controls on capital outﬂows 
(ﬁnancial crises), extensive exchange con-
trols (ﬁnancial crises), long-standing 
controls and their liberalization, and rapid 
liberalization.
B. Chile
De Gregorio,  1988:Q1– IV and VAR. With these, the authors address  High
Edwards, and  1998:Q2 simultaneity problems, exogenous upward 
Valdés (2000) trend in capital ﬂow, bias due to measure-
ment error because of loopholes in controls. 
They consider two alternative measures of 
expected devaluations: (a) eﬀective rate of 
depreciation, and (b) one-step-ahead forecast 
from a rolling ARMA. They consider two 
alternative measures of ﬂows: (a) short-term 
ﬂows to GDP, and (b) total ﬂows to GDP.
Edwards (1999a) June 1991– Descriptive analysis of the composition of cap- High
September  ital ﬂows during capital control times. VAR on 
1998 the eﬀects of capital controls on the real exchange
rate. GARCH for changes in the short-term central 
bank nominal interest rate and changes in the log 
of the stock market index.
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Econometric 
Study Sample Methodology rigor
Edwards (1999b) October 1994– GARCH for changes in the short-term cen- High
January 1999 tral bank nominal interest rate, and changes 
in the log of the stock market index, using 
daily data. Descriptive analysis of the eﬀects 
of capital controls on the composition of 
capital inﬂows, on domestic interest rates, 
and on monetary policy independence.
Edwards and  January 1991– Using stochastic calculus, the authors com- High
Rigobon (2004) September  pute the shadow exchange rate and its bands. 
1999 GARCH (eﬀect of capital controls on propa-
gation of external shocks). Estimate a mean 
and a variance equation.
Gallego, Hernández,  1989–1998:Q2  Least squares estimation, controlling for spu- High
and Schmidt- and July 1998– rious correlation, endogeneity of the RHS 
Hebbel (1999) June 1999 regressors, heteroskedasticity, and autocorre-
lation. Cointegration analysis and error cor-
rection model. 2SLS estimation also included.
Labán and Larraín  1985–1996 Descriptive analysis of events, describing the  Low
(1998) context for implementing capital controls 
and the main macroeconomic eﬀects.
Larraín, Labán, and  1985–1994 Estimation of a special case of nonlinear  High
Chumacero (2000) models in which a particular variable may 
adopt a certain law of motion conditional on 
an observation past a threshold (special case 
of Markov switching regime models, with the 
threshold replacing the transition matrix). 
The authors run a full-sample parsimonious 
regression for each series, to determine vari-
ables to include in the threshold process; for 
given choice of threshold variable, they esti-
mate the model and get the p-value associated 
with a null of a unique stable representation; 
if the latter is rejected in favor of threshold 
process, the authors choose the threshold 
variable that minimizes the sum of squares of 
residuals, and reduce the threshold model to 
a parsimonious representation.
Laurens and  1985:Q1– Linear and cubic approximations of net in- High
Cardoso (1998) 1994:Q4 ﬂows as primary explanatory variables of 
interest rate diﬀerentials.
Le Fort and  1990–1994 Descriptive analysis of events, describing the  Low
Budnevich (1997) context for implementing capital controls 
and the main macroeconomic eﬀects.
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Econometric 
Study Sample Methodology rigor
Reinhart and Smith  1990–1994 Event comparison through time rescaling  Medium
(1998) (labeling the implementation of controls as 
period t, and analyzing the evolution of the 
series in t – 1 through t   2. Detailed chrono-
logical description of the various measures 
applied in each economy.
Valdés-Prieto and  1987–1995 Error correction representation (that is eﬃ- High
Soto (2000) cient) with a two-step procedure: (a) OLS 
estimation of the real exchange rate on a set 
of explanatory variables to contrast the esti-
mated residuals, and (b) using these residuals 
to estimate by OLS an error correction equa-
tion measuring the deviation of the depen-
dent variable from its long-term equilibrium 
level (given by step [a]). The authors check 
for several endogeneity and simultaneity 
biases. They also look at the eﬀect of controls 
on short-term credit.
C. Colombia
Le Fort and  1990–1995 Descriptive analysis of events, describing the  Low
Budnevich (1997) context for implementing capital controls 
and the main macroeconomic eﬀects.
Reinhart and Smith  1990–1995 Event comparison through time rescaling  Medium
(1998) (labeling the implementation of controls as 
period t, and analyzing the evolution of the 
series in t – 1 through t   2. Detailed chrono-
logical description of the various measures 
applied in each economy.
Ariyoshi et al. (2000) 1993–1998 Extensive descriptive and comparative  Low
country-studies analysis of time series in each 
episode, dividing facts according to controls 
on capital inﬂows (limiting short-term ﬂows), 
controls on capital outﬂows (ﬁnancial crises), 
extensive exchange controls (ﬁnancial crises), long-
standing controls and their liberalization, and rapid
liberalization.
D. Czech Republic
Reinhart and Smith  1994–1997 Event comparison through time rescaling  Medium
(1998) (labeling the implementation of controls as 
period t, and analyzing the evolution of the 
series in t – 1 through t   2. Detailed chrono-
logical description of the various measures 
applied in each economy.
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Econometric 
Study Sample Methodology rigor
E. Malaysia (1989)
Reinhart and Smith  1993–1996 Event comparison through time rescaling  Medium
(1998) (labeling the implementation of controls as 
period t, and analyzing the evolution of the 
series in t – 1 through t   2. Detailed chrono-
logical description of the various measures 
applied in each economy.
F. Malaysia (1994)
Ariyoshi et al. (2000) 1994 Extensive descriptive and comparative  Low
country-studies analysis of time series in each 
episode, dividing facts according to controls 
on capital inﬂows (limiting short-term ﬂows), 
controls on capital outﬂows (ﬁnancial crises), 
extensive exchange controls (ﬁnancial crises), 
long-standing controls and their liberaliza-
tion, and rapid liberalization.
G. Thailand
Ariyoshi et al. (2000) 1995–1997 Extensive descriptive and comparative  Low
country-studies analysis of time series in each 
episode, dividing facts according to controls 
on capital inﬂows (limiting short-term ﬂows), 
controls on capital outﬂows (ﬁnancial crises), 
extensive exchange controls (ﬁnancial crises), 
long-standing controls and their liberaliza-
tion, and rapid liberalization.
Notes: OLS   ordinary least squares; IV   instrumental variables; VAR   vector autoregression;
GARCH   generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic; ARMA   autoregressive moving
average; 2SLS   two-stage least squares.
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Table B.1 Capital Outﬂows: Methodology and Degree of Methodological Rigor
Econometric 
Study Sample Methodology rigor
A. Malaysia
Tamirisia (2004) January 1991– Error correction model. Series on net foreign  High
December  portfolio assets are by foreign portfolio assets 
2002 to isolate country-speciﬁc eﬀects.
Dornbusch (2001) Descriptive analysis of diﬀerent variables. Low
Edison and Reinhart  Test for equality of moments and changes in  High
(2001) persistence between capital controls and no 
controls, principal-components analysis; 
block exogeneity tests (VAR) for causality; 
GARCH for the eﬀects of controls on volatil-
ity; and Wald tests for structural brakes over 
a rolling window.
Kaplan and Rodrik  1992–1996 Shifted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences to separate  High
(2002) the counterfactual of capital controls versus 
IMF program–based recovery. This method-
ology enables the authors to reschedule the 
episodes by the timing of the crises (shifted). 
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences allows them to 
capture the comparison eﬀect of the recovery 
with capital controls vis-à-vis with a success-
ful IMF program, controlling for exogenous 
and country-speciﬁc eﬀects (static and dy-
namic).
Ariyoshi et al. (2000) 1998–2000 Extensive descriptive and comparative  Low
country-studies analysis of time series in each 
episode, dividing facts according to controls 
on capital inﬂows (limiting short-term ﬂows), 
controls on capital outﬂows (ﬁnancial crises), 
extensive exchange controls (ﬁnancial crises), 
long-standing controls and their liberalization, 
and rapid liberalization.
B. Spain
Viñals (1992) 1992 Descriptive analysis of economic policy mea- Low
sures and their eﬀect on various macroeco-
nomic variables.
Edison and Reinhart  1991–1993 Test for equality of moments and changes in  High
(2001) persistence between capital controls and no 
controls, principal-components analysis; 
block exogeneity tests (VAR) for causality; 
GARCH for the eﬀects of controls on vola-
tility; and Wald tests for structural brakes 
over a rolling window.
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Econometric 
Study Sample Methodology rigor
Ariyoshi et al. (2000) 1992 Extensive descriptive and comparative  Low
country-studies analysis of time series in each 
episode, dividing facts according to controls 
on capital inﬂows (limiting short-term ﬂows), 
controls on capital outﬂows (ﬁnancial crises), 
extensive exchange controls (ﬁnancial crises), 
long-standing controls and their liberaliza-
tion, and rapid liberalization.
C. Thailand
Edison and Reinhart  1995–1999 Test for equality of moments and changes in  High
(2001) persistence between capital controls and no 
controls, principal-components analysis; 
block exogeneity tests (VAR) for causality; 
GARCH for the eﬀects of controls on vola-
tility; and Wald tests for structural brakes 
over a rolling window.
Ariyoshi et al. (2000) 1997–1998 Extensive descriptive and comparative  Low
country-studies analysis of time series in each 
episode, dividing facts according to controls 
on capital inﬂows (limiting short-term ﬂows), 
controls on capital outﬂows (ﬁnancial crises), 
extensive exchange controls (ﬁnancial crises), 
long-standing controls and their liberaliza-
tion, and rapid liberalization.
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Table C.1 Multi-country Studies: Methodology and Degree of Methodological Rigor
Econometric 
Study Sample Methodology rigor
Montiel and  1990–1996 The authors construct indexes to measure in- High
Reinhart (1999) cidence and intensity of capital account re-
strictions. Estimation of ﬁxed-eﬀect panel 
regressions to explain volume and composi-
tion of capital ﬂows. Results are checked for 
robustness by IV estimations. Covers Indone-
sia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Mexico, the Czech Republic, 
Egypt, Kenya, and Uganda.
Reinhart and Smith  1990–1997 Event comparison through time rescaling  Intermediate
(1998) (labeling the implementation of controls as 
period t, and analyzing the evolution of the 
series in t – 1 through t   2. Detailed chrono-
logical description of the various measures 
applied in each economy. Covers Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, the Czech Republic, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philip-
pines.
Kaplan and Rodrik  1992–1996 Shifted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences to separate 
(2002) the counterfactual of capital controls versus 
IMF program–based recovery. This method-
ology enables the authors to reschedule the 
episodes by the timing of the crises (shifted). 
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences allows them to 
capture the comparison eﬀect of the recovery 
with capital controls vis-à-vis with a success-
ful IMF program, controlling for exogenous 
and country-speciﬁc eﬀects (static and dy-
namic). Covers Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia (monthly and quarterly data for 
1992–96—before crisis—and from crisis time 
and one year after).
Edison and Reinhart  1991–1999 Test for equality of moments and changes in  High
(2001) persistence between capital controls and no 
controls, principal-components analysis; 
block exogeneity tests (VAR) for causality; 
GARCH for the eﬀects of controls on vola-
tility; and Wald tests for structural brakes 
over a rolling window. Covers 1991–93 for 
Spain and 1995–99 for Brazil, Malaysia, and 
Thailand. Control group: the Philippines and 
South Korea.
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Econometric 
Study Sample Methodology rigor
Miniane and Rogers  January 1971– Panel VAR and individual-country VAR of  High
(2004) December  commodity prices, U.S. industrial production, 
1998 U.S. consumer prices, foreign industrial pro-
duction, foreign interest rates, U.S. Fed Funds 
rate, ratio of nonborrowed reserves to re-
serves, and nominal exchange rate in response 
to a 25 basis point increase in the Fed Funds 
rate. For the country-level VAR the authors 
regress each country separately, compute the 
cumulative exchange rate and interest rate re-
sponses, and ﬁnally regress country-speciﬁc 
responses on the values of capital control in-
dex, exchange rate regime, degree of dollari-
zation, and trade integration. Covers Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, 
the Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
Appendix D
Restrictions on Inﬂows and Prudential Requirements
For each country, the date in parentheses denotes the ﬁrst year of the surge
in inﬂows. Sources for Asian countries are Alﬁler (1994); Bank Indonesia
annual report, various issues; Bank Negara annual report, various issues;
and various Bank of Thailand reports. Sources for Eastern European and
Latin American countries are Central Bank of Chile (1991, 1992), Banco
de la Republica Colombia (1993, 1994); Banco de Mexico (1992); and
Conselho Monetario Nacional Brasil (1994, 1995).
Asia
Indonesia (1990)
March 1991: The central bank adopts measures to discourage oﬀshore
borrowing. Bank Indonesia begins to scale down its swap operations by
reducing individual banks’ limits from 25 to 20 percent of capital. The
three-month swap premium is raised by 5 percentage points.
Capital Controls: An Evaluation 667October 1991: All state-related oﬀshore commercial borrowing is made
subject to prior approval by the Government and annual ceilings are set
for new commitments over the next ﬁve years.
November 1991: Further measures are taken to discourage oﬀshore bor-
rowing. The limits on banks’ net open market foreign exchange posi-
tions are tightened by placing a separate limit on oﬀ-balance sheet po-
sitions. Bank Indonesia also announces that future swap operations
(except for “investment swaps” with maturities of more than two years)
will be undertaken only at the initiative of Bank Indonesia.
Malaysia (1989)
June 1, 1992: Limits on non-trade-related swap transactions are imposed
on commercial banks.
January 17, 1994–August 1994:Banks are subject to a ceiling on their non-
trade- or non-investment-related external liabilities.
January 24, 1994–August 1994: Residents are prohibited from selling
short-term monetary instruments to nonresidents.
February 2, 1994–August 1994: Commercial banks are required to place
with Bank Negara the ringgit funds of foreign banking institutions
(Vostro accounts) held in non-interest-bearing accounts. However, in
the January-May period these accounts were considered part of the eli-
gible liabilities base for the calculation of required reserves, resulting in
a negative eﬀective interest rate in Vostro balances.
February 23, 1994–August 1994:Commercial banks are not allowed to un-
dertake non-trade-related swap and outright forward transactions on
the bid side with foreign customers.
The Philippines (1992)
July 1994: The central bank begins to discourage forward cover arrange-
ments with nonresident ﬁnancial institutions.
Thailand (1988)
Banks’ and ﬁnance companies’ net foreign exchange positions may not ex-
ceed 20 percent of capital. Banks’ and ﬁnance companies’ net foreign lia-
bilities may not exceed 20 percent of capital. Residents are not allowed to
hold foreign currency deposits except for trade-related purposes.
April 1990: Banks’ and ﬁnance companies’ net foreign exchange position
limit is raised to 25 percent of capital.
August 8, 1995: Reserve requirements, to be held in the form of non-
interest-bearing deposits at the Bank of Thailand, on short-term non-
resident baht accounts are raised from 2 percent to 7 percent. While re-
serve requirements on domestic deposits are also 7 percent, up to 5
percent can be held in the form of interest-bearing public bonds.
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companies’ short-term (less than one year) promissory notes held by non-
residents. A variety of measures aimed at reducing foreign-ﬁnanced lend-
ing are introduced.
April 19, 1996: Oﬀshore borrowing with maturities of less than one year
by commercial banks, Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF)
oﬃces, ﬁnance companies, and ﬁnance and security companies will be
subject to a 7 percent minimum reserve requirement in the form of a non-
remunerated deposit with the Bank of Thailand. Loans for trade pur-
poses will be exempt.
Eastern Europe and Latin America
Brazil (1992)
October 1994: A 1 percent tax on foreign investment in the stock market is
imposed. The tax on Brazilian companies issuing bonds overseas is
raised from 3 percent to 7 percent of the total. (These taxes are both
eliminated on March 10, 1995.) The tax paid by foreigners on ﬁxed-
interest investments in Brazil is raised from 5 percent to 9 percent. (This
is reduced to 5 percent on March 10, 1995.) The central bank raises lim-
its on the amount of dollars that can be bought on foreign exchange
markets.
Chile (1990)
June 1991: A nonrenumerated 20 percent reserve requirement is to be de-
posited at the central bank for a period of one year on liabilities in for-
eign currency for direct borrowing by ﬁrms. The stamp tax of 1.2 percent
a year (previously paid by domestic currency credits only) is applied to
foreign loans as well. This requirement applies to all credits during the
ﬁrst year, with the exception of trade loans.
May 1992:The reserve requirement on liabilities in foreign currency for di-
rect borrowing by ﬁrms is raised to 30 percent. Hence, all foreign cur-
rency liabilities have a common reserve requirement.
Colombia (1991)
June 1991:A 3 percent withholding tax is imposed on foreign exchange re-
ceipts from personal services rendered abroad and other transfers that
could be claimed as credit against income tax liability.
February 1992:Banco de la Republica increases its commission on its cash
purchases of foreign exchange from 1.5 percent to 5 percent.
June 1992: Regulation of the entry of foreign currency as payment for ser-
vices is introduced.
September 1993: A nonrenumerated 47 percent reserve requirement is to
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rect borrowing by ﬁrms. The reserve requirement is to be maintained for
the duration of the loan and applies to all loans with a maturity of eigh-
teen months or less, except for trade credit.
August 1994: A nonrenumerated reserve requirement is to be deposited at
the central bank on liabilities in foreign currency for direct borrowing by
ﬁrms. The reserve requirement is to be maintained for the duration of the
loan and applies to all loans with a maturity of ﬁve years or less, except
for trade credit with a maturity of four months or less. The percentage of
the requirement declines as the maturity lengthens, from 140 percent for
funds that are thirty days or less to 42.8 percent for ﬁve-year funds.
Colombia (2002)
December 2004: Foreigners investing in domestic markets must now keep
their money in the country for at least one year.
Czech Republic (1992)
April 1995:The central bank introduces a fee of 0.25 percent on its foreign
exchange transactions with banks, with the aim of discouraging short-
term speculative ﬂows.
August 1, 1995: A limit on net short-term (less than one year) foreign bor-
rowing by banks is introduced. Each bank is to ensure that its net short-
term liabilities to nonresidents, in all currencies, do not exceed the
smaller of 30 percent of claims on nonresidents or 500 million Czech ko-
runa. Administrative approval procedures seek to slow down short-term
borrowing by nonbanks.
Mexico (1990)
April 1992: A regulation is passed that limits foreign currency liabilities of
commercial banks to 10 percent of their total loan portfolio. Banks must
place 15 percent of these liabilities in highly liquid instruments.
Appendix E
Restrictions on Outﬂows: Asia, Europe, and Latin America
For each country, the date in parentheses denotes the ﬁrst year of the surge
in outﬂows (or crisis). Sources are Banco de España; Bank Negara annual
report, various issues; various Bank of Thailand reports; Conselho Mon-
etario Nacional Brasil; and Dominquez and Tesar (chap. 7 in this vol-
ume).
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December 2001:The Corralitois established, limiting bank withdrawal lim-
its and restrictions on dollar transfers and loans. However, purchases
through checks or credit cards are available, and purchases of govern-
ment bonds. December 30: suspension of external payments (debt de-
fault). In January 2002 there is a 40 percent devaluation, and a dual
exchange rate regime is introduced (1.4 pesos per dollar for trade oper-
ations, with a ﬂoating regime for all other transactions). Later in the
month, there is an easing of bank withdrawal restrictions, followed by an
asymmetric pesoﬁcation: pesoﬁcation of dollar deposits at 1.4 pesos per
dollar, with dollar debts pesoﬁed at market exchange rate. There is uni-
ﬁcation of exchange rate regimes in a ﬂoating scheme; right to withdraw
wages and pension incomes in full is granted; Corralonis imposed; there
is a freeze of bank term deposits. In September of that year it is required
that stocks should be traded in domestic currency regulation. Since the
latter is widely resisted, it is eased, but the new restriction signiﬁcantly
increases transaction costs. In December 2002 the Corralitois rescinded.
Brazil (crisis ending the Real Plan, 1999)
March 1999: The government orders local investment funds to increase
their holdings of government bonds. The central bank raises the mini-
mum amount of sovereign debt that must be held in the country’s foreign
investment fund to 80 percent from 60 percent. This lowers the share
that can be held in other countries’ debt.
Malaysia (Asian crisis, 1997)
September 1998: Bank and foreign exchange controls limit oﬀshore swap
operations and ban short-selling. There is repatriation of ringgits held
oﬀshore, and strict regulation of oﬀshore operations and most interna-
tional operations in ringgits; export and import operations are allowed
in foreign currency only; there is a twelve-month waiting period for non-
residents to sell proﬁts from Malaysian securities; approval is required
to invest abroad (above certain limits). In December residents are al-
lowed to grant loans to nonresidents to purchase immovable property.
In January 1999 some derivative transactions for nonresidents are per-
mitted. In February there is a gradual ease on the twelve-month waiting
period, and some repatriation funds are exempted from exit regulations.
In March export and import trade ceilings are raised for operations with
Thailand. In September commercial banks are allowed to enter into
some short-term currency swaps with nonresident stockbrokers. In
March 2000 funds from the sale of securities purchased by nonresidents
can be repatriated without paying an exit levy; in June administrative
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September 30: Some oﬀshore banks are allowed to invest in ringgit as-
sets. December 1: Foreign-owned banks are allowed to increase domes-
tic credit. In February 2001 the exit levy is abolished for some opera-
tions. In May of that year the remaining exit levy is abolished. In June all
controls on nonresidents’ futures and options are abolished. In July, res-
ident ﬁnancial institutions are allowed to extend ringgit loans to non-
residents investing in immovable property in Malaysia. In November
2002, resident banks’ credit levels to ﬁnance nonresidents’ projects in
Malaysia are raised. December 3: The foreign currency limit for invest-
ment abroad by residents is abolished, and payments are liberalized to
allow them to be in either ringgits or foreign currency.
Spain (ERM crisis, 1992)
September 1992:The Bank of Spain suspends regular money market oper-
ations and introduces foreign exchange controls. In October of that year
the peseta is devalued, and some of the controls are lifted. In November
the remaining foreign exchange controls are rescinded.
Thailand (Asian crisis, 1997)
May 1997: The Bank of Thailand (BOT) introduces restrictions on capital
account transactions. In June the BOT introduces additional measures
to limit capital ﬂows. Baht proceeds from sales of stocks are required to
be converted at the onshore exchange rate. Additional controls are in-
troduced, and later in the month a two-tier exchange rate is introduced.
In September of that year, additional controls on invisible and current
account transactions are introduced. In January 1998 it is required that
proceeds on exports and invisible transactions and current account
transfers be surrendered after seven days (instead of ﬁfteen days). At the
end of January, the BOT ends the two-tier exchange rate regime.
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